Australia's annual rate of productivity growth surged by over 1 percentage point in the 1990s. Three major possible explanations have been put forward: the use of more advanced information and communications technologies (ICTs), increases in workforce skills, and policy reforms designed in large part to drive and enable productivity improvement. The paper examines the contribution of ICTs in a productivity growth accounting framework.
A surge in productivity growth has underpinned Australia's good performance. After showing its weakest rate in the 1980s, Australia's productivity growth accelerated by a little over 1 percentage point to new highs in the 1990s -labour productivity growth at an average 3.2 per cent a year and multifactor productivity (MFP) growth at 1.8 per cent a year.
The much improved performance has stimulated a search for reasons. A few commentators have disputed the significance of the evidence of a productivity surge by speculating about the influence of recovery from the early 1990s recession and measurement error. 1 But the length and strength of the productivity resurgence -controlling for cyclical influencesdemand some 'structural' explanations. Most attention has focused on three candidates:
• a shift in the production frontier due to the introduction of new technologyspecifically information and communications technologies (ICTs);
• a shift toward the frontier through efficiency improvements stimulated by a set of microeconomic policy reforms -'catch-up' gains from firms moving toward best practice and from resources shifting to where they can be used more productively; and
• an increase in average education attainment and skills that would increase human capital deepening and promote innovation through the absorption and development of technologies and efficient business practices.
1 To account for an acceleration in productivity growth any measurement error would have to have worsened (if an over-estimation) or diminished (if an underestimation). The latter is more possible in that estimation of productivity in some service industries may have improved. On the other hand, many OECD countries have similarly improved and harmonised aspects of estimation, without generating estimates of productivity acceleration anywhere near the strength of Australia's. This paper concentrates on the first possible explanation, particularly since there has been worldwide interest in ICTs as a source of productivity growth. A comparison with US experience, using a growth accounting framework, provides the basis for assessing the contribution of ICTs to Australia's aggregate productivity acceleration. Productivity growth and the ICT contributions to it are sensitive to cyclical effects. This study is distinguished from others by the attention paid to selection of periods that minimise cyclical effects. The paper also draws on other empirical work to briefly assess other possible explanations.
An overview of Australia's productivity performance
Australia's recent productivity performance needs to be set in a broad historical and international context to highlight some of the developments that should be covered in a comprehensive explanation of the 1990s surge.
A broad sweep across countries and the decades
Australia's rate of productivity growth was comparatively low over most of the 20 th century.
At the beginning of the century, Australia had one of the highest levels of labour productivity in the world (Maddison 2001) , reflecting the combination of a relative abundance of natural resources and a relatively small population. Governments subsequently traded this high productivity position for nation building as, with widespread popular support, they encouraged population growth, diversification of the economic base and redistribution of income through a set of policies that (perhaps unintentionally) held growth in productivity in check.
Nevertheless, Australia still enjoyed a relatively high ranking at the start of the post-war era.
In 1950, Australia's GDP per hour was 81 per cent of the productivity leader -the USAand it ranked 4 among a group of 22 developed or high-income countries (figure 1 2 and table 1).
2 Figure 1 shows productivity levels in 22 OECD countries in 1950 22 OECD countries in , 1960 22 OECD countries in , 1973 22 OECD countries in , 1990 22 OECD countries in and 2001 . Some observations are offset from the reference year on the chart to avoid overwriting.
Figure 1 Labour productivity in OECD countries, 1950 OECD countries, , 1960 OECD countries, , 1973 OECD countries, , 1990 OECD countries, and 2001 GDP per hour (US$ at purchasing power parity) A string of policy reviews in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s attributed this relatively poor performance to highly regulated product, capital and labour markets and the inefficient provision of economic infrastructure (energy, water, transport, communications), which was dominated by government-owned enterprises operating without clear commercial imperative or performance regulation.
As a consequence of relatively poor productivity growth, Australia's ranking on the international league table of GDP per capita also dropped -from 5 in 1950 to 15 in 1990 (table 1) . 
The productivity surge in the 1990s
Figure 2 shows the rates of labour productivity growth over productivity cycles in the market sector of the Australian economy. Measurement over productivity cycles -from productivity peak to productivity peak -neutralises the spurious influence of the business cycle. The latest period, 1998-99 to 2001-02, is not a complete cycle. Since productivity growth over this period cannot be taken confidently to be an underlying rate, attention is focused on the most recent completed cycle, 1993-94 to 1998-99.
The figure shows that Australia's productivity growth rebounded in the 1990s, with underlying rates reaching record highs. The record 3.2 per cent annual average labour productivity growth in the 1993-94 to 1998-99 cycle compares with an average of 2.0 per cent in the previous cycle and 1.7 per cent over the cycles from 1981-82 to 1993-94. Source: ABS 5204.0 and Productivity Commission estimates.
MFP growth was the major contributor to improved labour productivity growth. With the rate of capital deepening stable at around 1.4 per cent a year, better MFP growth has accounted for all of the acceleration in Australia's underlying labour productivity growth (figure 2). Record MFP growth of 1.8 per cent a year accounted for around two-thirds of labour productivity growth in the 1990s cycle. MFP accelerated from 0.7 per cent a yearthe average over both the previous cycle and the three cycles between 1981-82 and 1993-94.
The start of the surge cannot be pin-pointed with precision because of recession-related effects. Figure 3 suggests that the Australian economy took a new growth path, based on In summary, Australia's productivity and average income growth were relatively poor when there was a world-wide productivity boom in the catch-up and convergence era of the postwar period. Australia only started to catch up on the USA during the 1990s -a period of mixed performance across countries. The USA itself accelerated, contributing to a breakdown in convergence. 4 Australia not only kept pace with, but exceeded, the US acceleration to record one of the highest accelerations in the OECD area (OECD 2001a). T r a n s . & s t o r a g e F i n a n c e & i n s u r a n c e 1988-89 to 1993-94 1993-94 to 1998-99 Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
Whilst productivity growth remained relatively strong in this most of these industries in the 1990s cycle (Mining and Manufacturing being exceptions), all these industries experienced a deceleration compared with the previous cycle. On these estimates, none made a contribution to the productivity surge from 1993-94.
A new set of service industries emerged in the 1990s. The stand-out performer was Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on ABS data.
Key features of the productivity surge
This sketch of Australia's productivity performance has highlighted the following key developments that need to be explained:
• From an international perspective, Australia's productivity growth switched from being relatively slow over at least four decades to become relatively fast in the 1990s.
• The acceleration in labour productivity growth came through improved efficiency (MFP growth) rather than increased capital deepening.
• The 1990s surge in MFP growth originated in a new set of service industries, in particular Wholesale trade, Construction and Finance & insurance.
The absence of a worldwide productivity boom, the relative strength of Australia's productivity acceleration and its starting point in the early 1990s suggest that some specifically Australian factors must form at least an important part of the explanation.
The contribution of ICTs is now assessed. There was an ICT boom in the 1990s in a number of countries, including Australia. 
Aggregate growth accounting 6
A conventional productivity growth accounting exercise is now used to assess the influence of ICTs on Australia's productivity performance. A comparison with the USA is used to infer the likely contribution of ICTs to Australia's aggregate productivity growth.
The estimates of Australian labour productivity growth and the growth accounting contribution to it are based on national accounts data constructed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). In keeping with modern practice, the ABS uses hedonic (or constantquality) price deflators to estimate real volumes of ICTs produced and purchased. Hedonic prices have not been specifically generated for Australia. The ABS uses the US price deflator for hardware, adjusted for exchange rate movements and a time lag, and a price 6 The growth accounting presented in this section is updated from Parham, Roberts and Sun (2001) .
deflator for software that shows a nominal 6 per cent a year decline. The US and Australian deflators are shown in figure 5. Source: Unpublished ABS data, and BLS data.
There has been a string of US studies of ICT contributions to productivity growth. For brevity, however, this paper focuses on comparisons with the USA, based on Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) data. Using BLS data brings two advantages:
• the ABS models its methods closely on BLS methods, and this enhances comparability 7 ; and • access to the BLS dataset assists flexibility in choosing periods for comparison.
A capital services measure of capital input is used and labour input is measured by hours worked. US studies also include a labour composition or 'quality' component, but this component cannot be estimated on a comparable basis or for the entire period for Australia.
7 Nevertheless, there are a few differences of note. Australian data cover IT, without communications equipment, whereas US data cover ICTs. The US estimates used here cover the private business sector, whereas Australian estimates cover the market sector. The main difference between the two is that the ABS-defined market sector excludes Property & business services.
Consequently, this component is added back into the US MFP growth estimates presented below to assist comparability with Australian estimates. 8
There was a big step up in contributions from ICT capital deepening from 1995 in the USA and Australia (figure 6). The timing and strength of the ICT capital deepening contributions in the two countries are remarkably close. This suggests that there have been similar rates of increase in ICT use in the two countries and supports the validity of using the USA as a comparator for the assessment of the impacts of ICT use in Australia. 9 Major examples of studies using pre-and post-1995 periods are Oliner and Sichel (2000) , Gordon (2000) , Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and CEA (2001). Gordon, however, does make a cyclical adjustment. Simon and Wardrop (2001) is an Australian example.
10 A Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to form the trend series presented in figure 7 . This does not clearly identify the Australian peaks as being above trend. However, the ABS uses an 11-period Henderson moving average to identify a trend series and (the same) productivity peaks in official productivity estimates. Issues with the break point and sensitivity can be set aside by analysing contributions to trend rates of productivity growth. The ABS method of estimating productivity growth over productivity cycles -from productivity peak to productivity peak -is one way of measuring underlying rates of growth. Adopting this method puts the prime focus on accelerations in underlying rates of productivity growth.
The contributions to labour productivity growth over productivity cycles are shown for the 5 1960 to 1966 1966 to 1973 1973 to 1976 1976 to 1986 1986 to 1992 1992 Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
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There are several important similarities in the US and Australian results:
• ICTs have made strong capital deepening contributions. The ICT capital deepening contribution has increased steadily from the 1960s in both countries (figures 8 and 9).
ICT capital deepening accounted for around a third of labour productivity growth in both countries in their respective 1990s cycles. ICT capital deepening made the same contribution (0.3 of a percentage point) to the 1990s labour productivity accelerations in both countries (table 3) . 11
• However, there has been little or no increase in the overall rate of capital deepening in either country, especially in Australia ( contributed to a marked increase in the rate of substitution of capital for labour.
• MFP growth accounted for over half the labour productivity growth in the 1990s cycle in both countries. Faster MFP growth accounts for most of the 1990s labour productivity accelerations in both countries -entirely so in Australia's case.
11 The slightly lower contribution in the US was due to stronger labour input growth rather than weaker ICT capital growth. The stronger productivity acceleration in Australia suggests that the Australian economy benefited from one or both of two factors: bigger gains from the use of ICTs and/or more gains from non-ICT factors. In either case, it does not necessarily mean -and generally it is highly unlikely -that productivity levels in Australia have moved ahead of US levels.
Rather, as the background in section 2 suggests, it is likely that Australia had more scope to improve from a lower base and has caught up on at least some of the superior US levels.
It seems reasonable to assume, consistent with the US leadership in productivity and ICTs, that the US estimates establish the upper limit of 0.3 of a percentage point on the productivity acceleration that can be associated specifically with ICT production and use. 12
Studies, such Oliner and Sichel (2000) , have attributed around 0.3 of a percentage point of aggregate MFP growth acceleration to ICT production, although the acceleration was calculated pre-and post-1995 and may therefore overstate the contribution to the acceleration in trend productivity growth. 13 The acceleration over productivity cycles would be less -perhaps half or 1 or 2 tenths of a percentage point.
Even if the more favourable view of the importance of ICTs is taken from the comparison between the first and second halves of the 1990s, table 3 suggests that the maximum acceleration due to production and use of ICTs is 0.6 of a percentage point (the MFP acceleration in the USA). Taking the contribution of ICT production to be around 0.3 of a 12 This implicitly assumes that no other contributors to productivity growth, such as technological change unrelated to ICTs, have accelerated in the USA. Using the USA as a benchmark for Australia also implicitly assumes that there are no important differences in industry composition between the two economies.
13 There has been some overstatement of the productivity acceleration apportioned to ICT production. Productivity improvements have been calculated by the dual method of measuring price declines and attributing them entirely to productivity improvements. The estimated magnitude fits well with other econometrically-based evidence. Bean (2000) used a cross-country regression as a basis to calculate that Australia's rate of ICT uptake would have contributed 0.12 percentage points to annual productivity growth. Gretton, Gali and Parham (2002) constructed an aggregate contribution of 0.14 percentage points from the formal analysis of firm-level data.
An industry perspective
Whilst the evidence to date suggests that MFP gains associated with ICTs at the aggregate level are significant, but not spectacular, there is evidence of stronger links in some industries. In some countries, including the USA, Japan, Korea, Finland and Ireland, there are opportunities for very substantial productivity gains in the manufacture of ICTs.
There also appear to be stronger links associated with the use of ICTs in certain industries.
Several studies of the USA have found evidence of productivity acceleration in the 1990s in The relationship between ICT use and productivity growth is complex rather than immediate and direct. ICTs are often viewed as general-purpose technologies that require time to bring to their full potential and enable productivity gains by providing a platform for other innovations in products and processes (see for example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) ).
The Australian evidence supports the view that it is changes in products and processes, enabled at least in part by ICTs, that generate productivity gains. 15 The Finance & insurance industry has been restructured to operate much more through ICTs (for example, ATMs, Internet and phone banking) than through traditional face-to-face contacts, leading to a restructuring of branch operations. Many new products (for example, financial derivatives) are now on offer.
An earlier study by Productivity Commission staff (Johnston et al 2000) also found that
ICTs played a part in the restructuring of wholesaling activities. Wholesalers were able to use bar-code and scanning technology and inventory management systems as part of the process of transforming wholesaling from a storage-based to a fast flow-through operation.
The complexity of the relationships between ICT use and productivity performance 
Other explanations
The conclusion that ICTs have only contributed a relatively small part of the acceleration leaves the vast bulk of Australia's improved performance unexplained -an unsatisfactory point on which to finish this paper. This section briefly draws on other work to at least consider other possible explanations. confirmed. On the other hand, there is a gap in the ability of education and skill levels to explain the broad sweep of Australia's productivity performance. When Australia's average years of schooling was above other countries around the 1960s and early 1970s, the rate of productivity catch-up was relatively poor. After a period of relatively slow growth in attainment and when Australia's average schooling had fallen below other countries, the rate of productivity catch-up was relatively high. Without undermining the general importance of education and skills, this suggests that other factors were acting as the main constraint on productivity growth in earlier decades and as the main facilitators of productivity growth in the 1990s. It is also difficult to explain the industry sources of the productivity acceleration in terms of education and skills -perhaps not so much in financial intermediation, but certainly in Wholesale trade.
Education and skills

Steve
Policy reforms
By the 1980s, Australia's continued slippage on the international league table of average income, combined with pessimism about the future, galvanised community support for governments to take policy action to address structural weaknesses in the Australian economy. Key objectives were to raise growth in productivity and living standards.
Policy reforms, which have been introduced progressively since the mid-1980s, have included: deregulation of access to finance; floating the currency; marked reductions in barriers to trade and foreign direct investment; commercialisation (and some privatisation) of government business enterprises; strengthening domestic competition; and increasing labour market flexibility.
Policy reforms were designed to improve productivity performance by:
• sharpening incentives to be more productive, chiefly by strengthening competition from domestic and overseas sources;
• opening the economy to trade, investment, technologies and know-how developed overseas; and
• providing greater flexibility (for example, less regulatory restriction, more flexible labour markets) to adjust production processes and firm organisation to improve productivity.
It may be a matter of logic that, if previous policy frameworks were holding productivity growth in check, reform of those frameworks would allow productivity to accelerate. But empirical evidence is needed to confirm the importance of reforms.
A number of analysts, calling on a range of empirical and other evidence, have found that microeconomic policy reforms have played a major role in Australia's productivity surge (see, for example, PC 1999 , Bean 2000 , Dowrick 2000 , Forsyth 2000 , OECD 2001b ).
Macroeconomic policies have also been framed in ways that have helped to maintain stability in output growth.
However, it is difficult to put a particular order of magnitude on the influence of policy reforms on productivity growth. Formal analysis is not straightforward, particularly since it is difficult to construct a measure of policy reform at the aggregate level that accurately quantifies the timing, breadth and intensity of reforms. By definition, reforms have operated at the micro level through a mixture of industry measures (eg deregulation, commercialisation of government enterprises), sectoral measures (eg phased reductions in tariffs on manufactures) and general measures (eg deregulation of access to finance and the introduction of enterprise flexibility into workplace bargaining). Furthermore, it is difficult to specify a structure of lags between implementation of reforms (which was often graduated) and production response.
Despite these difficulties, Salgado (2000) The influence of policy reforms can explain the developments in the Australian economy outlined in section 2. It can explain improvements in efficiency (MFP growth rather than capital deepening). Reforms were intended to realise catch-up gains by forcing and enabling businesses to improve technical efficiency (moving towards best practice), reduce or close inefficient operations and adopt a more innovative, market-driven culture. Delayed success in catch-up, facilitated by policy reforms, can explain Australia's transition from an international laggard to a frontrunner in productivity growth. It would also provide a 'homegrown' or Australian-specific explanation for the productivity success in the 1990s.
Reforms could also help to explain the emergence of rapid and innovative use of ICTs in the 1990s. With stronger competitive incentive, businesses became more alert to the opportunities that new technologies provide and, with greater flexibility, became better able to put them to productive use.
But can the introduction of policy reforms explain the industry sources of the productivity involved streamlined delivery of imported products and more customised products from local producers building fewer models at fewer production plants. Another contributor in some areas of wholesaling was the reform of industrial relations processes that allowed greater labour flexibility through the introduction of split shifts and reduced the rigidity of job demarcations.
A plausible explanation for the productivity gains in wholesaling is that, under increased competitive pressure, businesses rationalised production facilitates and took advantage of more efficient transport and information systems to reconfigure their distribution processes.
They greatly reduced costs of storage and handling in the process. The large productivity gains in wholesaling were passed on, with profit margins declining in the 1990s (Parham, Barnes, Roberts and Kennett 2000) .
Conclusions
Australia's labour productivity and MFP growth reached record highs in the 1990s. An acceleration of over 1 percentage point shifted Australia from being a laggard to being a frontrunner on productivity growth among OECD countries. Higher labour productivity growth in the 1990s came from improved efficiency rather than capital deepening. A new set of service industries, particularly Wholesale trade, Construction and Finance & insurance, appear to be at the heart of the productivity acceleration.
Taking into account the historical and international trends, it seems clear that the Australian economy has embarked on a process of catch-up, much-delayed in comparison with many other high-income countries. Australia has not been favoured in comparison to other countries by some new technology, a change in the structure of industries, a leap forward in the skills of the workforce or any other obvious structural factor. It seems that there has been a general improvement in efficiency of resource use that has narrowed, but not eliminated, the productivity gap with many other advanced economies. 16 This paper has concentrated on the role that ICTs may have played in Australia's productivity surge. Australia is a high user but low producer of ICTs. As an importer of countries -do not sit well with Australia's historically and internationally strong productivity surge in the 1990s. There would appear to be only a weak link between skills and the industry sources of productivity growth -particularly in wholesaling.
Nevertheless, education and skills could still have some indirect influence through absorption of technology. The uptake and productive use of ICTs is a particular case in point. (The productivity impacts of skills and ICTs would therefore not be additive.)
There is theoretical and empirical support for policy reforms playing a substantial role in Australia's productivity surge through catch-up gains in efficiency. Nevertheless, further empirical evidence would help to bolster this conclusion. Policy reforms also provide plausible explanation for Australia's shift from laggard to frontrunner and the industry sources of the productivity acceleration.
Rather than being 'alternative' explanations, reforms ICTs and skills can be seen as 
